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TAXATION - INCOME TAX - CAPITAL GAINS - CosT BAsis To D1sTRIBUTEE -Testator died in 1903, and the executors turned over the residue
of his estate to themselves as testamentary trustees in 1905. In 1923, pursuant
to the will, trustees delivered part of the original trust property, together with
other property purchased with trust funds, to plaintiff, the equitable remainderman under the trust. In 1930 plaintiff sold some of the securities which had
constituted the corpus of the trust. In determining the cost basis for the capital
gains tax on this transaction, plaintiff claimed that the market value on the date
when the trustees delivered the property to him in 1923 should be controlling
under the Revenue Act of 1928, which provides that the cost basis with respect
to general bequests should be the value of the property at the time of "distribution to the t;nq>ayer." The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the taxpayer's contention, but the circuit court of appeals reversed this decision.1 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held, two justices dissenting, that the decision of the circuit court
of appeals must be affirmed, since the cost basis of securities which were part of
the testator's estate is their value at the time they were transferred from the
executors to the trustees. Also, the proper valuation of securities purchased by
the trustees with trust funds is the cost to the trustees. Maguire v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 313 U. S. I, 61 S. Ct. 789 ( 1941 ).2

Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. L. 818, § II3 (a) (5).
In two related cases decided on the same day, the Court extended the doctrine
of the principal case to cover contingent remainders and ruled that under the doctrine
McFeeley v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 56 S. Ct. 54 (1935), property sold within
two years after the termination of the trust was "held" for more than two years so as
to subject the sale to the capital gains tax, Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. L. 811,
1

2
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Prior to 1928, the cost basis for the capital gains tax on all property obtained
by devise, bequest, and inheritance was the market value "at the time of such
acquisition." 8 Because of variant interpretation of the word "acquisition," 4
the House bill of I 928 provided that the value at the date of decedent's death
should be the basis. 5 Perceiving that the House bill would not properly cover
the situation where the property is purchased by the executor,6 the Senate provided in the final draft of the Revenue Act of 1928 that the value at the time
of "distribution to the taxpayer" should determine the cost basis.7 The Board of
Tax Appeals, in sustaining the plaintiff's contention, interpreted "distribution
to the taxpayer" to mean distribution from the trustee to the beneficiary.8 The
principal case settles the conflict among the circuit courts of appeal as to what
constitutes distribution to the taxpayer. 9 While the beneficiary, rather than the
trustee, is recognized as the taxpayer,1° the Court holds there is a "distribution"

§ IOI (c) (8), since the period of "holding" dates from the time of the testator's death,
or, in the case of property bought by the trustees, from the date of purchase. Helvering
v. Gambrill, 313 U.S. II, 61 S. Ct. 795 (1941); Helvering v. Campbell, 313 U.S.
15, 61 S. Ct. 798 (1941).
3
Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. L. 227, § 202 (2); Revenue Act of 1924,
43 Stat. L. 258, § 204 (a) (5); Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 14, § 204 (a) (5).
4
While the usual construction held the date of "acquisition" to be the date of
testator's death, a few cases held that a residuary legatee did not acquire the property
until it was distributed to him by the executor. F. W. Matthiessen, Jr., 2 B. T. A.
921 (1925); Alice Fisher Foster, 7 B. T. A. II37 (1927); Nellie B. McGee, 13
B. T. A. II8I (1928). Conflicting interpretations of "acquisition" appeared also in
cases where the estate sold the property. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Bowers, (D. C. N. Y.
1928) 23 F. (2d) 941; McKinney v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 180 (1926).
5
H. R. 1, 70th Cong., 1st sess. (1928). See H. REP. 2, 70th Cong., 1st sess.
(1928), p. 18. T. D. 4885, 1939-1 INT. REv. BULL., part 2, p. 396.
6
S. REP. 960, 70th Cong., 1st sess. (1928), p. 26.
7
This language was continued in the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 169 at
199. But the 1934 act, 48 Stat. L. 680 at 706, returned to the language of the
1926 act, since the Supreme Court in the case of Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327,
50 S. Ct. II5 (1930), had eliminated most of the confusion over the meaning of the
word "acquisition" by holding that the date of decedent's death, rather than the date
of distribution of the property by the executor to the legatee, was controlling.
8
Richard Van Nest Gambrill, 38 B. T. A. 981 (1938); Marjorie K. Campbell,
39 B. T. A. 916 (1939); Ralph W. Harbison, 26 B. T. A. 896 (1932); Margaret
E. B. Fleming, 36 B. T. A. 773 at 777 (1937). See note 1, supra.
9
The view of the Board of Tax Appeals was followed in Commissioner v. Gambrill, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 530; United States v. Van Nostrand, (C. C. A.
1st, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 510; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Libby, (C. C.
A. 1st, 1938) JOO F. (2d) 458 (one judge dissenting). The ruling later adopted by
the Supreme Court in the principal case was anticipated by Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Maguire, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) III F. (2d) 843; and Jenkins v. Smith,
(D. C. Conn. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 433.
10
The trustee pays no tax where he turns the property over to the remainderman,
and can hardly be called the latter's agent; nor can the trustee and the beneficiary be
regarded as a "sort• of dual tax personality." Commissioner v. Gambrill, (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 530.
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to the beneficiary when the executor delivers the property to the trustee, since
the beneficiary at that time first acquires an interest in a general bequest of
personalty.11 If the construction of the Board of Tax Appeals were followed,
there would be an even greater discrepancy between the dates for the valuation of
remainders of realty and personalty under the same trust, since all property passing at death except general bequests of personalty is valued as of the date of
death. The Court stated it was not the intent of the Revenue Act to extend the
statutory exception to the usual "value-at-death" rule beyond the period when
the estate was in the hands of the executors; 12 for, to immunize the gain from
taxation for such a long period would destroy the symmetry of the income tax
structure.18 Although for federal estate tax purposes no complete inter vivos
transfer is consummated in cases involving contingent interests,14 it is doubtful
whether such an analogy to estate tax principles is sound, since the tax here is on
the gain, and not on the remainder itself or its transfer, so there can be no question of taxing something which the remainderman never receives. On the other
hand, in support of the view of the Board of Tax Appeals, it has been observed
that a probate court does not in any accurate sense make a "distribution" of
property, but at most makes only an "ascertainment." 15 It, therefore, is difficult
to say that property is "distributed" to a contingent remainderman, or "held"
by him when it is in the trustee's hands. Also, the Court's concern over the loss
of revenue which would ensue from the rule of the Board of Tax Appeals
appears unwarranted. Following the reasoning of the principal case in two
companion decisions the Court ruled that in determining whether property was
"held" more than two years so as to entitle its sale to the lower capital gains
tax rather than the regular income tax, the period of "holding" by the taxpaper
11

GARDNER, WILLS, 2d ed., § 178 (1916). But see Deacon v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 197 S. W. 261 (1917), holding that a residue of personalty
vests in the legatee immediately on the death of the testator, just as in the case of
realty and specific bequests of personalty.
12 That the Senate report spoke only of the application of the statute to purchases
by the executors is no reason for limiting the application of the report to property so
purchased. Since the executor often acts as trustee and may make purchases in either
capacity, it is quite conceivable that the report also contemplated the situation after
the estate had been wound up and the property in the hands of trustees. Commissioner
v. Gambrill, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) n2 F. (2d) 530.
18 It must be remembered that the stock might equally well decline in value, in
which event, the revenue of the United States would be increased by taking as cost
the value at the later date. The period during which the gain is free from taxation
should not be considered too shocking, for there are many situations in which capital
gains are tax-exempt, e.g., the increment during the testator's life where the property
is not sold until after his death; the increment after death where the executor sells the
property; and, under the ruling of the principal case, the increment during the period
when the estate is in the hands of the executors. Commissioner v. Gambrill, (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 530.
14 As illustrated by Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940),
which holds that the transfer is incomplete until the donor's death where a possibility
of reverter is retained.
15 Jenkins v. Smith, (D. C. Conn. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 433.
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begins at the date of the testator's death.16 Hence, in the situation where the
taxpayer sells the property within two years after receiving it from the trustee,
but more than two years after the testator's death, the lower rates of the capital
gains tax must be substituted for the regular income tax. Under the view of the
Board of Tax Appeals, the period of holding probably would date from the
beneficiary's receipt of the property, so the income tax would apply, thus entitling the government to a higher tax. As for the securities purchased by the
trustees, the principal case holds that such property is not "acquired by will" so
the statutory exception to the "value-at-death rule" does not apply.17 Hence
the basis of valuation is cost to the trustee. This is a reasonable construction,
since the title of the clause is "property transmitted at death," and the statute
makes no mention of purchases by testamentary trusees.18

David N. Mills

1 «1 Helvering v. Gambrill, 313 U. S. II, 61 S. Ct. 795 (1941); Helvering v.
Campbell, 313 U.S. 15, 61 S. Ct. 798 (1941).
17 The circuit court of appeals in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Libby,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 458, failed to mention that the issue was whether
§ II3 (a) (5) applied at all, since it tacitly assumed its application and centered its
argument on the proposition that, because the executor never delivered the property to
the trustee, there was no "distribution" until the termination of the trust.
18 Since a trustee can become a taxpayer liable for the gains tax if he both buys
and sells, there would seem to be no logical reason for exempting the gain if the
remainderman rather than the trustee does the selling. On the other hand it can be
argued that in a broad, less technical sense, such property is "acquired by will," so as
to fall within the language of the statute, because the corpus from which the property
was purchased is acquired by will and the remainderman would never receive the
securities but for the will. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 155 (1938).

